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THE “DUTY OF SAMENESS” AS A SHIELD—GENERIC DRUG
MANUFACTURERS’ TORT LIABILITY AND THE NEED FOR
LABEL INDEPENDENCE AFTER PLIVA, INC. V. MENSING
1

*

Danielle L. Steele
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2009, healthcare expenditure in the United States reached
$2.5 trillion and accounted for 17.6% of the gross domestic product,
with prescription-drug spending embodying approximately 10% of
2
that amount. In 2010, prescription-drug spending continued to
3
grow, ultimately reaching $307.4 billion. The President’s Fiscal
Budget for 2012 allocated a greater percentage of the national
economy to healthcare than to any other category, including national
4
defense and social security. Given the substantial deficit in which
America remains, the significance of managing healthcare outlay is
5
irrefutable.
While the increase in prescription-drug spending from 2009 to
2010 reveals undeniably significant monetary figures, the growth rate

1

131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author
would like to express sincere gratitude to her family and friends—her mother above
all—for their unfailing support and patience. Without each and every one of you I
would not be where I am today.
2
NHE
Fact
Sheet,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/nationalhealthexpenddata/downloads/highlights.pdf
(last
updated June 14, 2011, 6:37 AM) (stating that in 2009 prescription-drug spending
was $249 billion, approximately 10% of the $2.5 trillion spent that year).
3
IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE UNITED
STATES:
REVIEW
OF
2010,
at
15
(Apr.
2011),
available
at
http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/ims/Global/Content/Insights/IMS
%20Institute%20for%20Healthcare%20Informatics/IHII_UseOfMed_report1_.pdf.
4
The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2012, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/winning-the-future/interactive-budget (last visited Dec.
9, 2011) (Healthcare Percentage of Budget: 22.62%; National Defense Percentage of
Budget: 19.27%; Social Security Percentage of Budget: 20.04%).
5
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS
FOR
FISCAL
YEAR
2012,
at
2
(Apr.
2011),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12130/04-15-AnalysisPresidentsBudget.pdf
(showing that the national deficit was $1.294 trillion in 2010).
*
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6

was 45% less than the preceding year. An abundance of plausible
explanations for the decline exist, but an increase of greater than
26% in the generic drug sector undoubtedly played a substantial role
7
in the spending reduction. Specific to cost savings and accessibility
in pharmaceuticals, the merits of generic prescription drugs are
8
virtually uncontested. The cost of a brand-name drug is on average
76% greater than that of its generic equivalent; government
healthcare programs, private insurers, and citizens alike recognize
9
this savings directly. In a 2010 report expounding the advantages of
generic drug use for Medicare prescription plan costs, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated that over 90% of
prescriptions written in 2007 were filled with generic drugs, where
10
both the generic and brand-name drug were available. The CBO
estimated the resultant savings of such substitution in just one year to

6

IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 3, at 4 (5.1% in 2009
compared to 2.3% in 2010). See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27,
112th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2011) (“Federal dollars currently account for an estimated
30[%] of the $235,000,000,000 spent on prescription drugs in 2008, and this share is
expected to rise to 40[%] by 2018.”).
7
IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 3, at 6 (combining the
growth of generics and authorized generics); see infra note 31 and accompanying text
(describing authorized generics).
8
Press Release, Generic Pharmaceutical Ass’n, Health Care Reform: One Year
Later—GPhA Presses Need to Generate Savings in Health Care Reform Efforts (Mar.
23, 2011), available at http://www.gphaonline.org/media/press-releases/2011
/health-care-reform-one-year-later-gpha-presses-need-generate-savings-healt.
In a
press release citing data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services the
Generic Pharmaceutical Association announced that “the Medicaid generic
dispensing rate now stands at 69% nationwide. Just a [one] percentage point
increase in this rate would save states and the Federal Government $682 million.” Id.
This figure takes all prescriptions filled into account even where there were not
generic options available. Id.
9
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS
5 (Dec. 1, 2010), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/GenericDrugs/ib.pdf
[hereinafter EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS].
10
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON MEDICARE’S
PRESCRIPTION
DRUG
SPENDING
7
(Sept.
2010),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11838/09-15-PrescriptionDrugs.pdf
[hereinafter EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS]. For purposes of this Comment, a
“generic” drug refers to a pharmaceutical product equivalent of the brand-name
drug marketed subsequent to the innovating company’s patent expiration or
adjudicated invalidity; “brand-name” drugs will interchangeably be referred to as
“list” drugs to maintain consistency with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
vocabulary on the topic. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS,
APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at x (32nd
ed. 2012) [hereinafter THE ORANGE BOOK] available at http://www.fda.gov
/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf.
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11

be greater than $33 billion.
Decades of legislative efforts have shaped a framework favoring
entrance of generic competition to brand-name pharmaceutical
12
products the moment patent protection expires.
The vast and
flourishing industry of generic drug manufacturers places vital
significance on the implications of a recent United States Supreme
13
Court decision. On June 23, 2011, in a five-to-four decision, the
Court rendered an unanticipated interpretation of the preemptionby-impossibility doctrine, holding that manufacturers of generic
prescription drugs are immune to liability for state tort failure-to14
warn claims.
The subsequent denial of a rehearing renders the
15
necessity of agency regulation or legislative intervention inevitable.
In granting certiorari for this decision, the Court consolidated
16
the actions of patients Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy. Pursuant
to their physicians’ care, Mensing and Demahy were each recipients
of prescriptions for the brand-name drug Reglan to treat
17
gastrointestinal symptoms; both received the corresponding generic
11

EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 10 (noting that industry
observers proffer a similar rate of generic use where both generic and brand-name
drugs are available in the private sector); see also Doug Long, VP Industry Relations,
IMS, Presented to NCPO: The US Pharmaceutical Market: Trends, Issues, & Outlook, slide
27 (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://ncpo.hdma.net/pdfs/long.pdf (disregarding the
availability of a generic alternative, 73.6% of all prescriptions were filled with
generics as of September 2010).
12
See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman
Amendments], for the hearings on the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act. See generally, The Assoc. Press, A Historical Look at Healthcare
Legislation, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/nation
/washington/articles/2010/03/21/a_historical_look_at_health_care_legislation
(providing a timeline of centuries of healthcare legislation).
13
EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS., supra note 10, at 18 (“Drugs accounting for
another $43 billion in U.S. retail sales, representing a further 21[%] of the U.S. retail
market in 2007, will be subject to first time generic entry during 2010 through
2012.”).
14
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
15
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, reh’g denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3078 (2011).
16
Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct.
817 (2010), reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 56 (2011), and rev’d sub nom. PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 55 (2011);
Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
17
See
generally,
Gastroparesis,
AMERICAN
DIABETES
ASS’N,
http://www.diabetes.org/living-with-diabetes/complications/gastroparesis.html (last
visited Apr. 26, 2012) (discussing gastroparesis as a condition causing delayed
expulsion of food from the stomach resulting in symptoms including bloating, acid
reflux and discomfort amongst others—this was Mensing’s diagnosis);
Gastroesophageal
Reflux
Disease,
PUBMED
HEALTH,
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drug, metoclopramide, from their pharmacists.
Both patients
19
developed tardive dyskinesia (TD) —a progressive and debilitating
neurological disorder—after their treatments exceeded the
20
recommended length of therapy. Mensing and Demahy brought
actions in their respective state courts against the individual generic
21
Each
manufacturers of the metoclopramide they had received.
plaintiff alleged that long-term use of metoclopramide had caused
her condition and claimed that the manufacturers were liable for,
inter alia, failure-to-warn in accordance with state product liability laws
22
in Minnesota and Louisiana. Amidst a growing circuit split on the
23
issue, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
found in favor of the co-existence of state tort law with the federal
prescription drug regulation and held that federal parameters did
24
not preempt the failure-to-warn claims. This Comment will develop
the preceding history and judicial interpretation involved in both
cases more extensively below.
The holding in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing came just two years after
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that federal regulations do not preempt
brand-name prescription drug manufacturers’ state tort liability for
25
failure-to-warn claims. In Wyeth v. Levine, the plaintiff, Diane Levine,
suffered irreversible gangrene, and ultimately amputation of her arm,
because of the method of administration used to deliver the anti26
nausea drug Phenergan. A Vermont jury found Wyeth, the drug
manufacturer, guilty of failure-to-warn of the risks associated with the

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001311/ (last visited Apr. 26,
2012) (describing gastroesophageal reflux as a condition in which the contents of
the stomach recede to the esophagus causing heartburn and general discomfort—
this was Demahy’s diagnosis).
18
Demahy, 593 F.3d at 430; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 605.
19
Demahy, 593 F.3d at 430; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 605.
20
TD is an incurable condition caused almost exclusively by long-term treatment
with certain medications.
Patients diagnosed with TD experience sudden,
uncontrollable movements of voluntary muscle groups in the face, limbs, and digits.
Tardive Dyskinesia, TD CENTER, http://www.tardivedyskinesia.com/symptoms/ (last
visited Apr. 26, 2012).
21
Demahy, 593 F.3d at 430; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 605.
22
Demahy, 593 F.3d at 430; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 605.
23
See, e.g., Demahy, 593 F.3d at 431 n.7 (providing examples of circuit court
decisions on the question of federal preemption of state tort law for generic
pharmaceuticals).
24
Mensing, 588 F.3d at 614; Demahy, 593 F.3d at 449.
25
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
26
Id.
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method of administration used and awarded damages.
The
28
Supreme Court of Vermont upheld the outcome. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court’s decision led to consensus among circuits that
federal regulation of prescription drugs did not preempt state tort
liability for failure-to-warn in the case of the brand-name drug
29
manufacturer.
Less clarity emerged with regard to Wyeth’s
application to generic pharmaceutical drug manufacturers and a split
30
ensued amongst circuits.
The precedent that the Supreme Court established in Mensing
results in inequitable and arbitrary consequences for patients, distorts
the doctrine of preemption, tips the balance of oversight between
state and federal powers, misinterprets congressional intent, and
impedes self-regulation; the holding compels legislative or regulatory
action. To provide context, Part II of this Comment will discuss the
federal regulations applicable to brand-name and generic
manufacturers as well as the legislative intent underlying their
promulgation. Part II will also discuss the resulting proliferation of
generic prescription use and forecasts of future growth. Part III will
introduce substitution laws throughout the United States that govern
the practice of pharmacists filling prescriptions for brand-name drugs
with generic counterparts. This part will also focus on other factors
influencing increased use of generics, such as formulary coverage by
private insurers, Medicare and Medicaid restrictions, and the
withdrawal of brand-name drugs from the market. Additionally, Part
III will address proposed and enacted healthcare reform and finally,
31
the controversial sector of authorized generics. Part IV will consider
the complementary objectives of state tort law and federal regulation
in the pharmaceutical industry. This part will also analyze the
traditional application of implied preemption-by-impossibility, as well
as the case law establishing that brand-name drug manufacturers are
27

Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006).
Id.
29
See, e.g., Wimbush v. Wyeth, 619 F.3d 632, 645 (6th Cir. 2010); Hughes v.
Boston Sci. Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 2011); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharms., 606
F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2010); Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 393
(7th Cir. 2010); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 586 F.3d 547, 563 (8th Cir. 2009).
30
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31
Authorized
Generics,
GENERIC
PHARM.
ASS’N,
http://www.gphaonline.org/issues/authorized-generics (last visited Apr. 26, 2012)
(“An authorized generic is the brand company’s own product repackaged and
marketed as a generic either through a subsidiary or third party. Brand companies
generally raise the brand drug’s price when the authorized generic is introduced—
resulting in an even greater expense to consumers.”).
28
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not liable for tortious conduct of generic manufacturers. Part V will
discuss Mensing in light of the preceding sections and develop the
dissent authored by Justice Sotomayor. Part V will also assess several
of the amicus briefs submitted to the court in Mensing as well as cases
decided in Mensing’s wake. Part VI will propose a solution through
either legislative action or agency regulation that places
manufacturers of generic drugs in a position parallel to that of brandname drug manufacturers with respect to label responsibility. Lastly,
Part VII will conclude.
II. TRIALS, TRIBULATIONS, AND TRIUMPHS—PROGRESSION IN THE
FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
A. The Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act
The United States has a centuries-old history of making public
health and welfare a centralized undertaking, with reformations
32
traditionally gaining momentum in times of exigency. In 1906, the
Food and Drug Act gave rise to the modern Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and allocated responsibility to that office for
consumer protection in relation to food and drugs used in interstate
33
commerce. The limited regulatory abilities of the FDA prompted
passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in
1938—for the first time the federal agency maintained significant
34
oversight of public health. The legislation vested power in the FDA
to control the approval and marketing of all drugs, shape the quality
standards for food, and inspect factories involved in food
35
production.
At present, the FDA provides the most comprehensive
framework governing public health and welfare as affected by food

32

Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm
(last visited Apr. 26, 2012) (an example of legislation in response to public outcry is
the Sherley Amendment of 1912. The amendment was the first to “prohibit[]
labeling medicines with false therapeutic claims intended to defraud the purchaser.”
The Sherley Amendment followed many infant deaths attributed to “Mrs. Winslow’s
Soothing Syrup for teething and colicky babies, unlabeled yet laced with morphine”).
33
History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA
/WhatWeDo/History/default.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2012).
34
Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Regulatory
Information/Legislation/default.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2012).
35
Id.
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and drug products in the developed world. The current state of
reform under the Obama Administration is responsive in part to the
inequitable limitations and selective coverage practices that privatized
health insurance companies use; healthcare affordability for every
37
patient remains a driving factor.
B. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act; the legislation is widely known as the
38
Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the FDCA.
The Hatch-Waxman
Amendments comprised two titles: “The purpose of Title I of the bill
[wa]s to make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a
39
generic drug approval procedure,” while “[t]he purpose of Title II
of the bill [wa]s to create a new incentive for increased expenditures
for research and development . . . [through] the restoration of some
36

See Regulations and Policies and Procedures for Postmarketing Surveillance Programs,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/ucm090394.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
The mission of FDA is to enforce laws enacted by the U.S. Congress
and regulations established by the Agency to protect the consumer’s
health, safety, and pocketbook. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act is the basic food and drug law of the U.S. With numerous
amendments, it is the most extensive law of its kind in the world. The
law is intended to assure consumers that foods are pure and
wholesome, safe to eat, and produced under sanitary conditions; that
drugs and devices are safe and effective for their intended uses; that
cosmetics are safe and made from appropriate ingredients; and that all
labeling and packaging is truthful, informative, and not deceptive.
Id.
Today, the FDA regulates $1 trillion worth of products a year. It
ensures the safety of all food except for meat, poultry and some egg
products; ensures the safety and effectiveness of all drugs, biological
products (including blood, vaccines and tissues for transplantation),
medical devices, and animal drugs and feed; and makes sure that
cosmetics and medical and consumer products that emit radiation do
no harm.
Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation
/Legislation/default.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
37
See The Affordable Care Act, THE WHITE HOUSE, PRES. BARACK OBAMA,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/healthreform/healthcare-overview#healthcare-menu
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (“The Affordable Care Act, passed by Congress and signed
into law by the President in March 2010, gives [patients] better health security by
putting in place comprehensive health insurance reforms that hold insurance
companies accountable, lower health care costs, guarantee more choice, and
enhance the quality of care for all Americans.”)
38
H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984).
39
Id. at 14.
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of the time lost on patent life while [a pharmaceutical] product is
40
awaiting pre-market approval.” The public policy purpose of Title II
sought to balance the effects of Title I with various incentives for
innovation; Title II has little relevance for purposes of this Comment
but does bear on market factors affecting brand-name
pharmaceutical pricing models. The substance of Title I will
constitute the discussion of this section for background purposes.
The expiration of patent protection on pharmaceutical products
provides an opportunity for competition from generic drug
manufacturers to drive market factors toward reduced drug costs for
the public. To further the purpose of the FDA, and of Title I of the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments, legislators sought to reduce economic
barriers to entry for generic pharmaceutical companies:
The manufacturer of a pioneer drug must conduct tests
on humans that show the product to be safe and effective
and submit the results in a New Drug Application (NDA).
A manufacturer of a generic drug must conduct tests that
show the generic drug is the same as the pioneer drug and
that it will be properly manufactured and labeled. This
information is submitted in an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA).
The only difference between a NDA and an ANDA is that
the generic manufacturer is not required to conduct
human clinical trials. FDA considers such retesting to be
unnecessary and wasteful because the drug has already been
determined to be safe and effective. Moreover, such
retesting is unethical because it requires that some sick
patients take placebos and be denied treatment known to
41
be effective.
In 1984, the ANDA procedure was available only to generic
manufacturers for drugs brought to market prior to 1962; the HatchWaxman Amendments extended the practice to brand-name drugs
42
developed post-1962. The stated purpose was increased availability
of low-cost generic drugs, and the legislative history reveals a
presumption of safety already existing in such products.
C. Bringing a Novel Drug to the Public: Rigors of the NDA
Estimates cited by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services in 2010 placed the cost of discovering and bringing a novel
40
41
42

Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.

STEELE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2013 4:04 PM

449

COMMENT
43

branded drug to market at over a billion dollars. The exorbitant
cost of innovation in the pharmaceutical field is unyielding, which
44
logically makes patent protection crucial to motivate innovation.
Brand-name drug pricing has consistently indicated this as
manufacturers incorporate the costs of bringing new products to
market in their products’ prices during exclusivity.
Chapter 9 of Title 21 in the United States Code lays out the
applicable federal regulations for drugs distributed in interstate
45
commerce as overseen by the FDA. The application for approval to
market a novel drug is extensive, requiring:
(A) full reports of investigations which have been made to
show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether
such drug is effective in use; (B) a full list of the articles
used as components of such drug; (C) a full statement of
the composition of such drug; (D) a full description of the
methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for,
the manufacture, processing, and packing of such drug; (E)
such samples of such drug and of the articles used as
components thereof as the Secretary may require; (F)
specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such
drug, and (G) any assessments required under section 355c
46
of this title.
The NDA investigation requirement mandates the applicant’s
provision of “[a] description and analysis of each controlled clinical
study pertinent to a proposed use of the drug, including the protocol
and a description of the statistical analyses used to evaluate the
47
study.” The applicant must further provide exhaustive detail of all
experiences and observations in any aspect of drug development and
48
ownership.
43

EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 4 (citation omitted).
Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and
Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUBLIC POL’Y REV. 2 (July 2002), available at
http://www.dklevine.com/archive/grabow-patents.pdf (“The importance of patents
to pharmaceutical innovation has been reported in several cross-industry studies by
economists.”).
45
21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (2006).
46
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006).
47
21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(ii).
48
This requires:
A description and analysis of any other data or information relevant to
an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the drug product
obtained or otherwise received by the applicant from any source,
foreign or domestic, including information derived from clinical
investigations, including controlled and uncontrolled studies of uses of
44
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Less than a single percent of compounds examined in preclinical trials ever make it to human examination and “[o]nly [20%]
of the compounds entering clinical trials survive the development
49
process and gain FDA approval.”
The FDA requires extensive
clinical trials that adhere to rigorous standards; according to the
CBO, completion of the necessary studies followed by approval of a
50
NDA takes over eight years on average.
The FDA review of clinical studies occurs in conjunction with
evaluation of the proposed labeling, which must also fulfill
51
comprehensive requirements.
NDA labeling specimen
requirements break down to several components, which must be
52
adhered to rigorously.
the drug other than those proposed in the application, commercial
marketing experience, reports in the scientific literature, and
unpublished scientific papers.
21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv).
49
Grabowski, supra note 44, at 4.
50
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 17 (July 1998),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf
[hereinafter
INCREASED
COMPETITION FROM GENERICS].
51
21 C.F.R. § 201.57.
52
The requirements break down as follows:
Description: Proprietary and established name of drug; dosage form;
ingredients; chemical name; and structural formula.
Clinical Pharmacology: Summary of the actions of the drug in humans;
in vitro and in vivo actions in animals if pertinent to human
therapeutics; pharmacokinetics.
Indications and Usage: Description of use of drug in the treatment,
prevention, or diagnosis of a recognized disease or condition.
Contraindications: Description of situations in which the drug should
not be used because the risk of use clearly outweighs any possible
benefit.
Warnings: Description of serious adverse reactions and potential safety
hazards, subsequent limitation in use, and steps that should be taken if
they occur.
Precautions: Information regarding any special care to be exercised for
the safe and effective use of the drug. Includes general precautions and
information
for
patients
on
drug
interactions,
carcinogenesis/mutagenesis, pregnancy rating, labor and delivery,
nursing mothers, and pediatric use.
Adverse Reactions: Description of undesirable effect(s) reasonably
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The label, once approved, forms the basis upon which physicians
53
rely in making their prescribing decisions for individual patients.
The label also provides patients with information they need to be
fully informed about the drugs they are consuming and the
likelihood of experiencing risks and benefits associated with such
consumption. Based upon its crucial role in placing consumers on
notice, the label constitutes a source of tort liability, thus providing
another powerful incentive for manufacturers to provide
comprehensive disclosure. Essentially, patients and physicians are
the end consumers of a manufacturer’s pharmaceutical product, so
the manufacturer is naturally inclined to balance a desire to stay
profitable with legal requirements of disclosure imposed by federal
regulation and risk of tort liability.
D. Imitation is Inexpensive and Encouraged: The Ease of the
Abbreviated New Drug Application
Based on the success of the Congressional actions discussed
supra, the average cost of bringing a generic drug to market is under
$2 million, less than a quarter of the average costs associated with
54
novel drugs.
“In essence, imitation costs in pharmaceuticals are
extremely low relative to the innovator’s costs for discovering and
55
A manufacturer filing an ANDA
developing a new compound.”

associated with the proper use of the drug.
Drug Abuse/ Dependence: Description of types of abuse that can
occur with the drug and the adverse reactions pertinent to them.
Overdosage: Description of the signs, symptoms and laboratory
findings of acute overdosage and the general principles of treatment.
Dosage/ Administration: Recommendation for usage dose, usual
dosage range, and, if appropriate, upper limit beyond which safety and
effectiveness have not been established.
How Supplied: Information on the available dosage forms to which the
labeling applies.
Shashank Upadhye, Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) Approval Process, Labeling
Review, in GENERIC PHARM. PATENT & FDA LAW, § 7:9 tbl.7-3 (Feb. 2012), available at
Westlaw GENPHARMA § 7:9.
53
Training and Continuing Education, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/default.htm (last visited Dec.
11, 2012) (stating that the “primary purpose [of drug labeling] is to give healthcare
professionals the information they need to prescribe drugs appropriately”).
54
EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 4–5 (citation omitted).
55
Grabowski, supra note 44, at 4.
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must include information showing that the generic drug for which it
seeks approval has the same active ingredients as the “listed drug” for
56
which it claims equivalence. The term “listed drug” refers to the
drug “identified by the FDA as the drug product upon which an
57
applicant relies in seeking approval of its ANDA.”
Inactive
ingredients are not required to be the same as the list drug upon
58
which the ANDA relies.
The application must “identify and
characterize the inactive ingredients in the proposed drug product
and provide information demonstrating that such inactive
ingredients do not affect the safety or efficacy of the proposed drug
59
product.” The ANDA must further provide “[i]nformation to show
that the route of administration, dosage form, and strength of the
60
drug product are the same as those of the reference listed drug.”
In lieu of clinical trials proving safety and efficacy for the drug’s
intended use, the ANDA must furnish data establishing the
61
bioequivalence of the generic drug to the list drug; this standard is
the driving force of generic manufacturers’ cost savings in the process
62
of bringing a drug to market. The FDA does not require active
ingredients to be identical for approval: “any formulations that have
minor differences in composition or method of manufacture from
the formulation submitted for approval, but are similar enough to be
relevant to the agency’s determination of bioequivalence [are

56

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
THE ORANGE BOOK, supra note 10, at x.
58
21 C.F.R. § 210.3(b)(8) (“Inactive ingredient means any component other
than an active ingredient.”). See generally 21 C.F.R. § 210.3(b)(7) (“Active ingredient
means any component that is intended to furnish pharmacological activity or other
direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or
to affect the structure of any function of the body of man or other animals.”).
59
21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(9)(ii).
60
21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(6)(i). See generally discussion supra Part II.C.
61
21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7)(ii); see also 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e).
Bioequivalence means the absence of a significant difference in the
rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in
pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes
available at the site of drug action when administered at the same
molar dose under similar conditions in an appropriately designed
study.
Id.
62
Facts and Myths about Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicine
Safely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/ucm167991.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2012)
(“Generic manufacturers . . . generally do not pay for costly advertising, marketing,
and promotion.”).
57
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63

allowable].”
In all applications, the generic manufacturer must
64
certify that the drug will not violate the patent of the listed drug.
The imitative nature of this process drastically increases the
likelihood that a generic manufacturer’s product will make it to
market.
Most relevant to this Comment, the ANDA must include “[a]
side-by-side comparison of the applicant’s proposed labeling . . . with
65
the approved labeling for the reference listed drug.” Simply stated,
“[l]abeling . . . proposed for the drug product must be the same as
66
the labeling approved for the reference listed drug.”
The regulations, however, do not require absolute identity
with the branded label. . . . [D]ifferences may include
“differences in expiration date, formulation, bioavailability,
or pharmacokinetics, labeling revisions made to comply
with current FDA labeling guidelines or other guidance, or
omission of an indication or other aspect of labeling
67
protected by patent or accorded exclusivity.”
The requirement of label mimicry is logical at the application stage
because the generic applicant relies entirely on the safety and efficacy
established vicariously by the list drug’s trials in support of the
original NDA. ANDA contenders have not conducted independent
trials and have no data adhering to FDA standards of reliability.
In the event that a generic manufacturer wishes to submit an
ANDA where the list drug is no longer marketed by the brand-name
manufacturer, the application “must contain all evidence available to
68
the petitioner concerning the reasons for the withdrawal from sale.”
Upon a determination that the marketing of the drug was not
discontinued for reasons associated with safety or efficacy, the ANDA
69
will be approved relying on the NDA of the discontinued drug :
The “Discontinued Drug Product List” identifies, among
other items, drug products that have been discontinued
from marketing for reasons other than safety or
63

21 C.F.R. § 320.1(g); see also Bioequivalence, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N,
http://www.gphaonline.org/issues/bioequivalence (last visited Apr. 26, 2012)
(“Based on FDA analysis of hundreds of bioequivalence studies, FDA has determined
that small differences in blood levels—less than 4%—may exist in some cases
between a brand and its generic equivalent.”).
64
21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12).
65
21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv).
66
Id.
67
Upadhye, supra note 52, at § 7:9 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv)).
68
21 C.F.R. § 314.122(a).
69
21 C.F.R. § 314.122(c).
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effectiveness. Approved ANDAs that refer to the NDAs
listed in this document are unaffected by the discontinued
marketing of the products subject to those NDAs.
Additional ANDAs that refer to these products may also be
approved by the agency if they comply with relevant legal
70
and regulatory requirements.
Brand-name manufacturers frequently withdraw products that are
subject to generic competition because they are no longer profitable
to maintain on the market. Once the product is removed from
public access, the manufacturer has no obligation to monitor its
safety, and safety will remain virtually unchanged as it pertains to that
product because the drug is no longer being produced or consumed.
“A third of generic drugs no longer have name-brand competitors at
71
all,” leaving consumers without brand-name options. As discussed
below, this also leaves the FDA as the only party capable of
unilaterally changing the label. Presently, no regulations exist that
alter the reporting requirements or label-updating abilities discussed
below of ANDA-approved drugs that rely on withdrawn list drugs.
E. Post-Approval Safety Compliance and Mechanisms of Independent
Label Modification
Safety, in terms of novel drugs, is a dynamic concept. The safety
studies conducted for NDA approval exist in a vacuum; by definition,
long-term safety cannot exist if a drug has not been present over an
extended period of time.
Furthermore, the market changes
perpetually—drug interactions will continue to arise as novel
compounds are invented and introduced to the public. In order to
maintain current data, manufacturers of approved drugs, whether by
72
NDA or ANDA, must comply with monitoring and reporting
requirements regarding the safety of the drug they market:
The manufacturer of a drug “shall promptly review all

70

Determination that MOTRIN (Ibuprofen) Tablets and Four Other Drug
Products Were Not Withdrawn From Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 75
Fed.
Reg.
48352,
48353
(Aug.
10,
2010),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-08-10/pdf/2010-19638.pdf.
71
Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567
(2011) (No. 09-993), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments
/argument_transcripts/09-993.pdf.
72
21 C.F.R. § 314.98(a) (“[E]ach applicant having an approved abbreviated new
drug application under § 314.94 that is effective shall comply with the requirements
of § 314.80 regarding the reporting and recordkeeping of adverse drug
experiences.”).
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73

adverse drug experience
information obtained or
otherwise received by the applicant from any source,
foreign or domestic, including information derived from
commercial marketing experience, postmarketing clinical
investigations, postmarketing epidemiological/surveillance
studies, reports in the scientific literature, and unpublished
74
scientific papers.”
The manufacturer must also “develop written procedures for the
surveillance, receipt, evaluation, and reporting of postmarketing
75
adverse drug experiences to the FDA.”
Regulations mandate that “[t]he applicant . . . report to the FDA
76
adverse drug experience information.”
An applicant’s failure to
conform to the recording and reporting requirements provides the
FDA grounds to “withdraw approval of the application and, thus,
prohibit continued marketing of the drug product that is the subject
77
of the application.” Both generic and brand-name drugs are subject
to virtually identical post-market requirements; this is delineated in
the regulations by referring generic drug manufacturers to the
78
regulations pertaining to drugs approved by NDA. Adverse event
reporting is a critical component to the FDA’s understanding of longterm safety. Although there are mechanisms for patients and
physicians to make such reports directly to the FDA, manufacturers
79
provide the vast majority of the submissions—over 96% in 2010.
One of the procedures available to a drug manufacturer to effect
label changes that it considers necessary based upon post-approval
73

Adverse drug experience is defined as:
Any adverse event associated with the use of a drug in humans, whether
or not considered drug related, including the following: An adverse
event occurring in the course of the use of a drug product in
professional practice; an adverse event occurring from drug overdose
whether accidental or intentional; an adverse event occurring from
drug abuse; an adverse event occurring from drug withdrawal; and any
failure of expected pharmacological action.
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a).
74
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv) (equivalent
standard promulgated for reporting in NDA).
75
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b).
76
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c).
77
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(j).
78
21 C.F.R. § 314.98.
79
In 2010, the FDA received 758,890 adverse event reports. Only 28,952 came
from reporting parties other than the manufacturer. Reports Received and Reports
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
Entered
into
AERS
by
Year,
U.S.
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm070434.htm (last visited
Dec. 11, 2012).
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discoveries is the submission to the FDA of a supplement to the
80
The regulation most
manufacturer’s approved application.
81
pertinent to this Comment applies to “moderate changes.” Where
the manufacturer of an already approved drug finds it necessary to
“add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or
adverse reaction,” the manufacturer may do so without prior FDA
approval so long as the agency receives notice “30 days prior to
82
distribution of the drug.” The manufacturer may make changes to
add or strengthen a statement about drug abuse,
dependence, psychological effect, or overdosage; . . . add or
strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration
that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug
product; . . . delete false, misleading, or unsupported
indications for use or claims for effectiveness;
83
“The
or for any other reason deemed appropriate by the FDA.
supplement must be labeled ‘Supplement—Changes Being
84
Effected.’”
The Changes Being Effected (CBE) method is not available to
85
manufacturers of generic drugs approved pursuant to an ANDA.
Although the regulation does not explicitly state so, the “supplements
are subject to the substantive standards governing applications, so the
CBE regulation must be read in conjunction with regulations
86
pertaining specifically to generic labeling.”
As illustrated supra,
“[t]hose regulations require a generic drug’s labeling to be the same

80

21 C.F.R. § 314.70.
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c).
82
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A).
83
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(B)–(E). But see Supplemental Applications
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73
Fed. Reg. 2848-01 (Jan. 16, 2008).
Allowing sponsors to unilaterally amend the labeling for approved
products without limitation—even if done to add new warnings—
would undermine the FDA approval process required by Congress.
Indeed, permitting a sponsor to unilaterally rewrite the labeling for a
product following FDA’s approval of a product and its labeling would
disrupt FDA’s careful balancing of how the risks and benefits of the
product should be communicated. . . . The CBE supplement
procedures are narrow exceptions to this general rule.
Id.
84
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(3).
85
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 (2011).
86
Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13,
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (No. 09-993), 2010 WL 4339894, at
*13.
81
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as the labeling of the reference listed drug.”
The FDA may withdraw approval of a generic drug approved
pursuant to an ANDA at any time if it is determined that the generic
drug’s labeling “is no longer consistent with that for the listed drug
88
referred to in the abbreviated new drug application.” As such, postapproval changes made unilaterally by generic manufacturers are
sufficient grounds for revocation of the FDA’s authorization to
market their drug. This conclusion is supported by the FDA’s
response to commentary reproduced in the preamble of the final
adoption of the ANDA regulations:
Two comments said the labeling provisions should be
revised to permit ANDA applicants to deviate from the
labeling for the reference listed drug to add
contraindications, warnings, precautions, adverse reactions,
and other safety-related information. One comment added
that ANDA applicants should be allowed to delete some of
the indications contained in the labeling for the reference
listed drug.
FDA disagrees with the comments. . . . ANDA product’s
labeling must be the same as the listed drug product’s
labeling because the listed drug product is the basis for
ANDA approval. Consistent labeling will assure physicians,
health professionals, and consumers that a generic drug is
as safe and effective as its brand-name counterpart. If an
ANDA applicant believes new safety information should be
added to a product’s labeling, it should contact FDA, and
FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic
and listed drugs should be revised. After approval of an
ANDA, if an ANDA holder believes that new safety
information should be added, it should provide adequate
supporting information to FDA, and FDA will determine
whether the labeling for the generic and listed drugs should
89
be revised.
It is a well “established proposition that an agency’s construction of

87

Id.
21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10).
89
Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17950-01, 17961
(Apr. 28, 1992) (internal citations omitted); see also Supplemental Application
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73
Fed. Reg. 2848-01, n.1 (Jan. 16, 2008) (“CBE changes are not available for generic
drugs approved under an abbreviated new drug application under 21 U.S.C. 355(j).
To the contrary, a generic drug manufacturer is required to conform to the
approved labeling for the listed drug.”).
88
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its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference.” A reading
of the FDA’s response can only lead to a conclusion that the agency
did not intend to make the CBE method available to generic
manufacturers.
The second tool for unilateral label modification implicated in
this Comment is known as the Dear Health Care Provider (DHCP)
91
letter.
The DHCP letter is an efficient method by which drug
manufacturers can communicate directly with prescribers to inform
92
them of updates similar in nature to those conveyed in a CBE.
Where a manufacturer deems a safety update necessary, the
manufacturer has the ability to send a direct communication to the
93
relevant healthcare providers; it is logical that the manufacturer
would prefer this direct method of disclosure to avoid conflicting use
by consumers. The federal regulation pertaining to this approach is
largely related to format and does not specifically prevent use by
94
generic manufacturers. FDA regulations, however, define “mailing
pieces . . . for use by medical practitioners . . . to be labeling,” making
the DHCP letter off-limits to generic manufacturers for purposes of

90

Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986); see also 2 FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 2:386
(2012).
It is presumed that Congress intended to invest interpretive power in
the administrative actor in the best position to develop historical
familiarity and policy-making expertise. Because applying an agency’s
regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the
agency’s unique expertise and policy-making prerogatives, it is
presumed that the agency’s power authoritatively to interpret its own
regulations is a component of the agency’s delegated law-making
power.
2 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra.
91
21 C.F.R. § 200.5; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEAR HEALTH CARE
PROVIDER LETTERS: IMPROVING COMMC’N OF IMPORTANT SAFETY INFO. 3 (2010), available
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/Guidances/UCM233769.pdf.
In general, a DHCP letter is used to inform health care practitioners
about important new information about a drug. In most cases, the new
information is about an important new safety concern that could affect
the decision to use a drug or require some change in behavior by
health care practitioners, patients, or caregivers to reduce the potential
for harm from a drug.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEAR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER LETTERS: IMPROVING
COMMC’N OF IMPORTANT SAFETY INFO. 3 (2010), supra.
92
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEAR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER LETTERS: IMPROVING
COMMC’N OF IMPORTANT SAFETY INFO. 3 (2010), supra note 91.
93
21 C.F.R. § 200.5.
94
Id.
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95

Hatch-Waxman Amendments: The Triumph of Title I

The Hatch-Waxman Amendments have produced vast success in
reducing both the time it takes for generic competitors of brandname drug manufacturers to get to market and prescription drug
costs for patients.
By accelerating the approval process for a generic drug and
also allowing its producer to begin clinical tests before the
patent on the innovator drug had expired, the HatchWaxman Act reduced the average delay between patent
expiration and generic entry from more than three years to
96
less than three months for top-selling drugs.
Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments “[i]n
1983, only 35[%] of the top-selling drugs with expired patents
(excluding antibiotics and drugs approved before 1962) had generic
97
versions available. Today, nearly all do.” IMS, a pharmaceutical
industry leader in data collection and analysis, asserts that from 2004
to 2010, generic share of total prescriptions in America increased
98
from 51% of the market to 74%. “The market available for direct
generic substitution has increased from 61% of total scripts to 81%”
and “[p]rice competition within the generic market is intense . . .
99
contributing to the decline in average therapy costs.” A 2007 yearend review published by the Generic Pharmaceutical Association
printed a Q & A with the organization’s President and CEO:
Clearly, there is confidence in the use of generic medicines
and the recognition of the benefits they provide. Every day,
more consumers are realizing that generics provide the
same medicine and the same results as brands, but at a
significantly lower cost. [Consumers] can also be assured
that generics are just as safe as brands because they are held
100
to the same high FDA approval standards.
The final sentence of this statement is particularly pertinent to this
95
96
97
98

21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2).
See INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERICS, supra note 50, at xiii.
Id.
The US Pharmaceutical Market: Trends, Issues, & Outlook, supra note 11, at slide

29.
99

Id.
KATHLEEN JAEGER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, GPHA, GENERICS: THE RIGHT CHOICE
BETTER
HEALTH
6
(2008)
available
at
FOR
http://www.gphaonline.org/sites/default/files/annual-report-2008.pdf.
100
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Comment. Safety extends beyond approval and the extent of clarity
and completeness in a warning label weighs heavily toward consumer
perception of safety.
In addition to significantly reducing the consumer price for
drugs upon the expiration of their patent, the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments have virtually eliminated the delay between a patent’s
ceased validity and the time elapsed before generic versions of the
drug enter the market; “most first generics are available when the
101
patent expires.”
It is common practice for “generic drug
manufacturers [to] submit applications to the FDA in advance of
patent expiration or in anticipation of resolution of a patent
102
dispute.”
Generic applications inundate the FDA at present, thus
“[t]o speed generic approvals, FDA . . . requested authority to collect
user fees for the review of generic drugs in the FY2011 President’s
103
Budget.”
The FDA, to supplement its resources in the drug
approval process, leverages user fees on new drug applicants as
authorized by the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of
104
2007.
This desire to expand user fees to generic manufacturers
reveals agency willingness to increase generic manufacturer costs in
some areas.
The ANDA procedure that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
created in 1984 remains substantially unchanged from its original
format as it pertains to this Comment.
III. NON-REGULATORY FACTORS DRIVING EXPONENTIAL GROWTH IN
THE GENERIC SECTOR
In conjunction with federal legislative emphasis on generic drug
availability, states and private companies have taken aggressive action
to increase the utilization of generic drugs.
Pharmaceutical
substitution of generic equivalents for brand-name drugs began as a
discretionary practice but is now a practice regulated state-by-state
105
that influences prescription volume exponentially.
Private health
insurers also aim to capitalize on the savings that generic
prescriptions provide and do so through patient benefit
101

See EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 10.
Id.
103
Id.
104
Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2012, 76 Fed. Reg. 147, 45831
(Aug. 1, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-08-01/pdf/2011
-19332.pdf.
105
See discussion infra Part III.A.
102
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106

manipulation. Government-provided healthcare employs stringent
policies that stimulate beneficiaries’ utilization of generic
prescriptions, and proposed legislation exhibits continued
107
development of these procedures.
Finally, the most controversial
parties to cash in on the generic market are the brand-name
manufacturers themselves.
Having already invested in the
compound, many companies remove the brand labeling and market
their original formulations as generics to take advantage of the
108
market influence of the federal and state practices.
A. State Substitution Laws
The substitution of generic drugs for their therapeutic
109
equivalent at the pharmacy is a common practice today; state law,
110
not the FDA, regulates substitution. These state laws are presumed
to be the single largest factor contributing to the fact that “[w]ithin
six months of patent loss, patients received the generic form of a
111
molecule 80% of the time in 2010.” Prior to passage of the HatchWaxman Amendments, if a physician wrote a prescription indicating
a brand-name drug, the pharmacist could not legally substitute that
112
drug with the generic counterpart. Naturally, the extra step for the
pharmacist of attaining physician consent minimizes the likelihood of
substitution. Just five years after the passage of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments, “the dispensing of generic drugs on ‘brand-written’
prescriptions rather than generically written prescriptions had
become the chief source of generic drug sales through
113
pharmacies.”
Presently, every state has a law in place governing
generic substitution of the therapeutic equivalent by pharmacists for
114
At last count,
prescriptions written for a brand-name drug.
fourteen states mandate generic substitution by pharmacists if “brand
106

See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Parts III.C, III.D.
108
See discussion infra Part III.E.
109
THE ORANGE BOOK, supra note 10, at vii (“Drug products are considered to be
therapeutic equivalents only if they are pharmaceutical equivalents and if they can be
expected to have the same clinical effect and safety profile when administered to
patients under the conditions specified in the labeling.”).
110
EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 3.
111
IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 3, at 21.
112
INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERICS, supra note 50, at box 2.
113
Id. (citing RICHARD E. CAVES, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & MARK A. HURWITZ, Patent
Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1–66 (1991)).
114
EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at app. A.
107
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only” is not indicated by the prescribing physician on the
115
prescription.
Generic manufacturers especially value substitution laws because
physicians consistently prescribe brand-name drugs rather than
generics; this may be due to habit, corporate marketing efforts, or
concern about the inactive ingredients in generics that vary from
116
their brand-name counterparts.
A study conducted for a
cholesterol medication revealed that “six months after patent
expiration, 98[%] of . . . prescriptions were [filled with the generic
equivalent] in states that did not require patient consent, while less
than one third of prescriptions were filled by [the generic] in states
117
that did require patient consent.”
This data reveals that, when
given a choice, patients have a strong preference for brand-name
118
This preference may be related to perceptions of value,
drugs.
safety, quality, manufacturer reputation or countless other possible
considerations.
Beyond state law’s influence, “pharmacists have a financial
incentive to [dispense] generics, as the mark up received by
119
pharmacies is largest for new generics.”
The wholesale costs of
generic drugs are generally lower than those of brand-name drugs,
reducing stocking outlays for pharmacy owners and increasing
120
marginal profits.
The pharmaceutical industry recognizes this
advantage more consistently with government-sponsored health care
programs, thus the current reform scheme’s public mandate will
increase the influence of pharmacists in the allocation of generic and
121
brand-name prescription fulfillment.
115

Id. (Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and West
Virginia).
116
Id. at 12.
117
Id. at 8.
118
See id.
119
EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 8.
120
INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERICS, supra note 50, at n.10.
121
See John M. Coster, Trends in Generic Drug Reimbursement in Medicaid and
PHARM.
(June
17,
2010),
available
at
Medicare,
U.S.
http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/s/127/c/21147/.
Tens of millions of new Americans will have access to health insurance
starting in 2014 through a combination of Medicaid expansions and an
increase in the availability of federally sponsored private health
insurance. Prescription drug coverage will be mandated as part of these
new health insurance plans. This means that federally sponsored
health care plans will pay for even more prescription drugs than they
do now, and federal reimbursement policies will have more influence
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B. Private Healthcare Payors
Private pharmaceutical benefit management companies (PBMs)
are another prominent external factor on generic prescription
volume. PBMs strategically manipulate pricing and coverage in order
122
to influence patient behavior in prescription fulfillment. The drug
coverage that a plan provides can diminish the cost burden of brandname drugs over the generic equivalent, leading the consumer to
believe that any perceived superiority of the brand-name drug is
123
worth the small price differential.
To avoid this occurrence and
reduce their own costs, PBMs utilize tiered formulary coverage; tiers
generally apply higher copays to brand-names than to generics,
thereby encouraging patient utilization of the cheaper generic
124
drug.
“An IMS National Prescription Audit shows that a typical
formulary now charges $6 for generic medications, $29 for preferred
125
branded drugs, and $40 or more for non-preferred branded drugs.”
This price differential is likely to be substantial enough to influence
the average consumer’s choice. A more straightforward avenue for
PBMs is brand restriction on formularies. Formularies are a list of
126
drugs a patient can receive coverage for; by excluding brand-name
drugs, the PBM leaves the patient with only one alternative to the
generic: to pay cash.
Additional mechanisms engaged to reduce use of more costly
brand-name pharmaceuticals are deterrents aimed at the prescribing
physician; two such policy requirements are prior-authorizations and
127
step-therapy.
Prior-authorization mandates placed on specific
drugs create a requirement for the physician to contact the PBM for
approval before the patient will receive coverage of the brand-name
128
drug in a class where a generic equivalent is available. Primary care
physicians frequently consult over thirty patients per day, placing
their time at a premium and significantly decreasing the likelihood
that they will engage in the necessary steps to obtain prior

on how generic drugs are used and how they are dispensed.
Id.
122

INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERICS, supra note 50, at 6.
Id. at 8–9.
124
EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 10, at box 1.
125
Facts and Myths about Generic Drugs, supra note 62.
126
EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at n.5.
127
See Stephan L. Burton et al., The Ethics of Pharmaceutical Benefit Management, 20
HEALTH AFF. 150, 151 (2001).
128
Id. at n.6.
123
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129

authorization.
Mitigating this likelihood further, patients do not
frequently discover the condition of prior authorization until the
patient brings the prescription to the pharmacy where the pharmacist
will in turn substitute the brand name with a generic in accordance
130
with state laws. Step-therapy is basically a series of prerequisites for
a brand-name drug, under which physicians are required to start with
a specified drug and gradually work their way up to a drug that the
131
PBM considers less preferable, generally for cost reasons. Patients
must fail to respond to the product, react negatively to the drug, or
otherwise not meet the physician’s goals in order to gain approval for
132
movement from one step to the next. Step-therapy is a hard stop to
prior authorization in many cases, requiring prerequisite conditions
before PBMs will cover a brand-name drug. On the other end of the
spectrum, physicians are also frequently incentivized monetarily for
133
their prescriptions. Given the minefield of mechanisms preventing
the use of brand-name drugs where generics are available, the market
status of generics becomes less surprising.
C. Medicare and Medicaid
In 1994, the CBO “estimated that the purchase of generic drugs
reduced the cost of prescriptions . . . by roughly $8 billion to $10
134
Preceding an expansion of prescription coverage for
billion.”
Medicare recipients in 2007, the Inspector General issued an
executive summary of the findings of a study assessing the savings
recognized by the government through patients’ use of generic drugs
in lieu of brand-name drugs:
Under Part D, plans have broad discretion to design plan
benefits and develop their drug utilization management
tools. The cost of the Part D prescription drug program for
2006 was lower than the original estimate of $59 billion, and
future cost estimates have also been reduced, due in part to
135
greater than anticipated generic drug use.
129

PHYS.
PRAC.,
Patients-Per-Day
Norms,
Jan.
1,
2008,
http://www.physicianspractice.com/qa/patients-day-norms.
130
See discussion supra Part III.A.
131
EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at n.8.
132
See,
e.g.,
Glossary,
BLUECROSS
BLUESHIELD
OF
TEX.,
http://www.bcbstx.com/partd/2011/glossary.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2012).
133
EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at n.7.
134
INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERICS, supra note 50, at 13.
135
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, GENERIC DRUG UTILIZATION IN THE MEDICARE
PART D PROGRAM, at i (Nov. 2007), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei
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Government Medicare and Medicaid programs recognize the cost
benefits in a similar fashion to private insurers discussed in the
136
preceding section, but by nature, the patients they insure have
insignificant choice in their insurance plans—Medicare and
137
Medicaid serve the elderly and the poor.
Characteristics that
qualify them for the medical coverage they receive also make them
less capable of absorbing drastic medical harm that will go
uncompensated by generic manufacturers based on the current
preemption of state tort liability, discussed infra.
In 2007, Medicare Part D, the prescription-drug benefit plan
under Medicare, saw 90% of prescriptions written for brand-name
138
drugs with generic counterparts filled with the generic option.
According to the CBO, “[t]hat figure reflects the strong financial
139
Most
incentives for . . . enrollees to use generics when available.”
recently, 2010 data reveals clear incentive for maintaining growth in
the use of generics; “Medicaid paid on average approximately $200
for each monthly brand prescription, compared to just $20 for a
month’s prescription in the generic version. . . . By increasing generic
utilization in Medicaid by just one percentage point, the government
140
and taxpayers would save more than $500 million each year.”
These patient populations are likely to see dramatic impact stemming
from the holding in Mensing.
D. Proposed and Enacted Legislation Favoring Generics
Present reform of healthcare maintains similar goals to those
perpetually sought by the FDA in more modern actions: affordability
and availability. While the costs of expanding general public
141
coverage are high, this is inevitably offset by the FDA’s centralized
guidance of patients’ drug choices to generics:
-05-07-00130.pdf.
136
Id. at iii.
137
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov (last visited Jan.
16, 2012).
138
EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 10, at 7.
139
Id.
140
Press Release, GPhA Commends Bipartisan Effort to Lower Health Care Costs
Through Increased Use of Affordable Generic Medicines (Nov. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/press-releases/2011/gpha-commends-bipartisan
-effort-lower-health-care-costs-through-increased-.
141
See One Year Later—GPhA Presses Need to Generate Savings in Health Care Reform
Efforts, supra note 8 (“By lowering eligibility requirements, the ACA will add
approximately 16 to 18 million new lives to the current 60 million Medicaid
beneficiaries.”).
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For brand-name drugs . . . plans will pay 2.5[%] of their cost
in 2013, increasing to 25[%] by 2020 and beyond. For
generic drugs purchased in that spending range, plans will
pay 7[%] of the cost in 2011; that coverage will increase
142
each year to reach a total of 75[%] by 2020.
Generic expansion is not limited to drugs approved by ANDA;
further reform efforts focus on extending the availability of
143
biologics.
Biologics have a tendency to be exceptionally costly
because they are generated from living organisms as opposed to their
144
manufactured pharmaceutical counterparts.
Prior to current
reform, manufacturers were not able to produce these drugs in
145
“The abbreviated
generic form through an abbreviated process.
pathway for approval of biosimilar biologic drugs under the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, within the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act” creates a new avenue for
146
savings.
The subsequent focus of private and government
pharmaceutical benefit plans will be to incentivize patients’ use of the
cheaper equivalent; most likely, this will be accomplished by the
means discussed supra. Consistent with the historic promotion of
affordability and availability, this act aims to reduce as many barriers
to consumer-use as possible while maintaining the safety and efficacy
of the regulated drugs.
E. Authorized Generics—If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them
As introduced above, the entrance of generic competition takes
the vast majority of a brand-name drug manufacturer’s market share
in a brief time span. Exorbitant costs of innovation create a need for
substantial incentive; patent protection for novel drugs provides just
that, but in a capitalist market, this does not seem to be sufficient.
Given the comprehensive preference for generic prescription
fulfillment in the private and public sectors, it is not entirely
142

EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 10, at 3.
Biologics represent the cutting edge of medicine, “and, in time, may offer the
most effective means to treat a variety of medical illnesses and conditions that
presently have no other treatments available.” This line of drugs is comprised of “a
wide range of products such as vaccines, blood and blood components, allergenics,
somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins.” What Are
“Biologics”
Questions
and
Answers,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsand
Tobacco/CBER/ucm133077.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
144
EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 10, at 18.
145
EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 10.
146
Id.
143
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surprising that brand-name manufacturers have found a surreptitious
way to capitalize on the self-perpetuating market of generics. In the
pharmaceutical industry, the practice of brand-name manufacturers
removing original packaging from their drugs and relabeling them as
147
generics is referred to as production of an authorized generic.
This practice has generated attention because it allows brand
manufacturers to usurp an exclusivity period granted to the first
generic manufacturer to successfully challenge a patent and come to
148
market with a competitor.
This Comment does not focus on the
independent complexities of this subject; instead, the existence of
authorized generics is relevant because Mensing seems to preempt
state tort liability for brand manufacturers if they market their
original compound as a generic. Although the brand manufacturer
would be liable for failing to warn consumers under the holding in
149
Wyeth, they escape such liability through a mere package change;
this bizarre result cannot be an intention of the legislature. In
essence, producers of a product can easily shield themselves from
consumer liability and are subject to no motivating requirement to
monitor safety. By this substantial loophole, all parties involved in
marketing an inherently dangerous product have accountability only
to maintain the status quo, regardless of what new dangers may come
150
to their attention.
147

See Development & Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDeveloped
andApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDA
Generics/ucm126389.htm#WHAT_IS_AG (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
An “authorized generic drug” is a listed drug as defined in § 314.3 that
has been approved under subsection 505(c) of the act and is marketed,
sold, or distributed directly or indirectly to retail class of trade with
either labeling, packaging (other than repackaging as the listed drug in
blister packs, unit doses, or similar packaging for use in institutions),
product code, labeler code, trade name, or trade mark that differs
from that of the listed drug.
Id.
148
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments granted a 180-day exclusivity period to the
first generic manufacturer in order to motivate prompt entrance of competition. 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). See FED. TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS:
SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM IMPACT, at
i
(Aug.
2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/2011genericdrugreport.pdf (“[C]ourts have ruled
that 180-day exclusivity does not preclude a brand-name company from entering with
its own generic because it already has approval for its product.”).
149
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
150
With the exception of a footnote to the dissenting opinion in Mensing, the
impact of that case’s holding on authorized generics is not illuminated. 131 U.S.
2567, 2589 n.12 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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IV. CHECKS, BALANCES, AND LIABILITY
The success of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and resultant
boom in the prescription-drug market placed an enormous burden
on an already beleaguered FDA. The long-standing relationship
between federal regulation and state tort law is crucial to the safety of
the prescription drug market.
While preemption doctrine is
implicated in considering federal regulation of consumer products as
it impacts public health in the case at bar, it substantially hinders one
underlying policy of all FDA legislation—safety. This Part establishes
several supporting reasons for this assertion.
A. The FDA’s Burden
Based on the FDA’s inception and development through present
day, it is arguable that its most significant underlying policy is that of
safety in products that members of the public consume. Within the
FDA, the Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology (OSE) and the
Office of New Drugs (OND) equally share the role of post-approval
151
safety oversight,
both operating under the Center for Drug
152
Evaluation and Research (CDER).
Within OSE, there are five
153
Two
divisions, three of which focus on post-approval safety.
Divisions of Pharmacovigilance “detect and assess safety signals for all
marketed drug products,” and the Division of Epidemiology
functions to “evaluate various postmarketing surveillance tools that
154
may be incorporated into risk management strategies.”
In a
recently published performance self-evaluation, the FDA noted that
“the number of generic applications submitted to CDER’s generic
drug program has grown considerably over the past decade—nearly
three-fold since 2001—outpacing the growth in program
155
personnel.”
151

John Jenkins, Gerald Del Pan & Janet Woodcock, Memorandum of Agreement
Between
the
[OND]
and
the
[OSE]
in
the
[CDER],
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformati
onforPatientsandProviders/UCM111520.pdf. It is unclear, however, whether this
division of responsibility has been updated despite its pre-determined expiration on
June 16, 2010.
152
Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacc
o/CDER/ucm106491.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
153
Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology (OSE)-Divisions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacc
o/CDER/ucm169536.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
154
Id.
155
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FY 2012 ONLINE PERFORMANCE APPENDIX 1,
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In a report requested by the United States Senate Committee on
Finance, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)
made reference to over thirty years of “[c]oncerns about the FDA’s
156
management of safety issues for drugs approved for marketing.” In
expanding on this unremitting issue, the GAO revisited a 2006 report
where it found that: “OSE management had not effectively overseen
postmarket drug safety and lacked systematic information;” the FDA
routinely failed to track “progression of postmarketing studies that
FDA had requested;” and that the “FDA faced constraints in its access
to data that allow[s] it to monitor the safety of marketed drugs . . .
[and] limited resources for staff training and supportive
157
technology.”
The GAO report noted that the FDA’s workload
continuously increases as they take on new responsibilities by
legislation and in 2009, they continued to be understaffed in the area
158
of postmarket drug safety.
Although regulations require that
adverse events are reported and compiled in a central location for
the purpose of monitoring safety, the utilization of this data is subject
to doubt—OSE staff members reported to the GAO that “workload

available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms
/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM242730.pdf.
156
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-68, FDA HAS BEGUN EFFORTS TO
ENHANCE POSTMARKET SAFETY, BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED 1 (2009)
[hereinafter
POSTMARKET
DRUG
SAFETY],
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1068.pdf. This is only one of multiple studies
revealing the inability of the FDA to sufficiently monitor the safety of pharmaceutical
drugs over a lifespan of market availability. See also BOARD ON POPULATION HEALTH
AND PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193–94 (2007), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11750&page=R1.
There is widespread agreement that resources for postmarketing drug
safety work are especially inadequate and that resource limitations have
hobbled the [FDA’s] ability to improve and expand this essential
component of its mission. Continued resource shortages will impede
the agency’s ability to use new and future scientific and technological
advances in drug research across the lifecycle. In particular, the
limited resources could impede the agency’s ability to detect risks of
new drugs in a timely fashion, analyze emerging drug safety data, and
effectively communicate that information to the public.
BOARD ON POPULATION HEALTH AND PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG
SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193–94 (2007), supra.
157
POSTMARKET DRUG SAFETY, supra note 156, at 10–11.
158
Id. at 31 (In a survey of OSE and OND staff members “[60%] . . . of the
employees said that they either were not able to meet their postmarket drug safety
responsibilities during an average workweek or were only able to meet these
responsibilities by working overtime.”).
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demands prevent them from reviewing these reports.” The report
estimated that the OSE would need to more than double the size of
160
its current staff in order to adequately monitor postmarket safety.
Even where a budget for staff is allocated, the FDA has been unable
to fill vacancies that account for half of the positions established for
161
drug safety experts over several consecutive years.
In February 2011, the GAO returned to the FDA to assess
162
progress in resolving the “high-risk” issues noted in the 2009 report.
The report enumerated almost identical concerns to the 2006 and
2009 issues, adding that “FDA staff have expressed concern about
their ability to meet a growing postmarket workload, with some
maintaining that their premarket responsibilities are considered a
163
higher priority.” Premarket safety is based on the trials required for
a NDA; these trials are typically comprised of a small subset of “the
population that will ultimately use the drug. Patients typically receive
the drug over a short duration. Elderly persons, pregnant women,
and patients who have other medical problems may be excluded, thus
enrolled patients may not reflect the patients who will take the
164
drug.”
A perceived focus on premarket safety is exceptionally
alarming given the inherent weaknesses of clinical trials for
establishing safety prior to approval.
B. State Tort Failure-to-Warn Claims
The FDA’s responsibility for drug oversight includes monitoring
165
“the 11,000 drugs on the market,” while expediting approval of new
drug applications in under-funded, under-staffed circumstances. The
need for tort liability to inspire self-regulation by manufacturers in a
complementary fashion is self-evident.
The FDA itself has
“recognize[d] that product liability plays an important role in
166
consumer protection.” The Supreme Court has also expressed the
view that “obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed
167
to be, a potent method of governing conduct.” Preemption of state
159

Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
161
Id. at 38.
162
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-278, HIGH-RISK SERIES 115 (1998).
163
Id. at 116–17.
164
POSTMARKET DRUG SAFETY, supra note 156, at 9.
165
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009).
166
Protecting the Identities of Reporters of Adverse Events and Patients [and]
Preemption of Disclosure Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 3944-01, 3948 (Jan. 27, 1994).
167
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 510 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring
160
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tort law in the context of pharmaceutical products emphasizes the
FDA’s history of inadequacy in the realm of post-approval safety
168
updates. The holding of Wyeth, discussed infra, enables plaintiffs to
recover damages if they can prove that a manufacturer of a brandname pharmaceutical product acquired knowledge of a danger posed
by their products, but not adequately disclosed by their labels, after
169
obtaining FDA approval.
Allegations of state tort law violations are generally drawn from
170
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The comments of the
Restatement shed light upon the underlying meaning in failure to
warn: “In order to prevent [a] product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning,
171
on the container, as to its use.”
More specific to the inherently
dangerous nature of pharmaceutical products, the comments
elucidate reluctance to impose broad liability, but instead aim to
generate consumer awareness and prevent harmful or fraudulent
172
practices.
Tort liability then, is in harmony with the FDA’s goals of
maintaining public safety without preventing innovation and access
to beneficial drugs. The FDA has iterated this proposition:
FDA does not believe that the evolution of state tort law will
cause the development of standards that would be at odds
with the agency’s regulations. FDA’s regulations establish
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)).
168
In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 489 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
169
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
170
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
171
Id. at cmt. j.
172
Id. at cmt. k.
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs. . . . Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the
like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to
physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there
can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients,
but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the
drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.
Id.
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the minimal standards necessary, but were not intended to
preclude the states from imposing additional labeling
requirements. States may authorize additional labeling but
they cannot reduce, alter, or eliminate FDA-required
173
labeling.
In fact, until quite recently, the FDA had emphasized its opposition
174
to preempting tort law with regard to drug labeling.
It is worth
noting that the FDA’s unsettled position is itself relevant to a finding
of preemption, and would generally lead a court to accord the agency
175
interpretation less weight.
In cases where patients injured by generic versions of
pharmaceutical products have attempted to hold the manufacturer of
the reference-listed drug liable, they have been categorically
176
unsuccessful.
The element of causation is only met if the injured
party in a pharmaceutical products liability claim establishes that he
177
or she has actually ingested the defendant’s product.
This
substantially increases the bearing of substitution laws and
preemption in FDA regulated products; because federal law does not
recognize private litigants with a right of action, consumer injuries
will be borne solely by the consumer if tort law is preempted.
C. Preemption Doctrine and Healthcare
Where a conflict exists between federal and state law, courts rely
on preemption doctrine to find the state law a nullity. This power
178
inures from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Federal
preemption is an issue that frequently comes before the U.S.
Supreme Court and is contentious for what opponents see as a
usurpation of state independence and what proponents see as a
173

Prescription Drug Product Labeling [and] Medication Guide Requirements,
63 Fed. Reg. 66378-01, 66384 (Dec. 1, 1998).
174
“FDA has determined that this proposed rule does not contain policies that
have federalism implications or that preempt State law.” Requirements on Content
and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics [and]
Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81082, 81103 (Dec.
22, 2000).
175
While agency consistency is a factor in a court’s consideration, it does not
entirely eliminate the deference they receive in such considerations. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984).
176
See, e.g., Stoddard v. Wyeth Inc., 630 F.Supp.2d 631 (E.D.N.C. 2009); Schrock
v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F.Supp.2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. 2009); Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc., 543
F.Supp.2d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
177
Absent a duty of care to an injured party, a defendant will not be found liable
for breach. Levine v. Wyeth Inc., 684 F.Supp.2d 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
178
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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valuable lubricant for interstate commerce.
The Court has
established three specific grounds by which courts should find
preemption of state law:
First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its
enactments pre-empt state law. . . . Second, in the absence
of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where
it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the
Federal Government to occupy exclusively. . . . Finally, state
law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with
federal law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where
it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state
180
and federal requirements.
Where preemption is not explicit, “[t]he purpose of Congress is the
181
ultimate touchstone.”
In the event that federal agencies exist to oversee specific areas
of interstate commerce, those agencies are on notice by Executive
Order to minimize preemption of state law to the greatest extent
182
possible. State tort laws are a common area of preemptive question
183
with respect to drugs and the FDA’s oversight of them. Recently, a
2008 committee report cited to extensive evidence of the FDA’s
acceptance of “state lawsuits as providing a valuable complement to
the agency’s regulation of these products. The agency has asserted
that these cases help to uncover risks that are unknown to the agency
at the time of approval and that they provide an important additional
184
layer of consumer protection.” In addition to its supporting role as
179

Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and State
Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimonies
of
Senator
Patrick
Leahy
and
Alan
Untereiner),
available
at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f
735da12d7b7c&wit_id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da12d7b7c-0-1
and
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f
735da12d7b7c&wit_id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da12d7b7c-1-2.
180
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).
181
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
182
Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 153 (Aug. 4, 1999) (“Any regulatory
preemption of State law shall be restricted to the minimum level necessary to achieve
the objectives of the statute pursuant to which the regulations are promulgated.”).
183
Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and State
Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony
of Senator Russ Feingold), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings
/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da12d7b7c&wit_id=e655f9e2809e5476
862f735da12d7b7c-0-2.
184
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REP.,
MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, FDA CAREER STAFF OBJECTED TO AGENCY PREEMPTION POLICIES
1 (Oct. 2008) (Report also noted that “assertions about the ability of the drug
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a negative motivator, there is a strong presumption against
preemption in regulation of health and safety because of the
185
traditional oversight by the states in this field.
D. FDA Regulation of Brand-Name Drug Manufacturers Does Not
Preempt State Tort Liability
As introduced above, Wyeth v. Levine involved a patient who
received an injection of the brand-name drug Phenergan, an antinausea medication, by a method that embodied a significant risk of
186
drastic consequences.
The tragic result for the patient, a
professional musician, was amputation of her arm following
187
irreversible gangrene.
Investigation revealed numerous missed
opportunities for the offending method to be circumvented through
188
an updated warning to the pharmaceutical product’s label.
This
case exemplifies substantial support for the key role that state tort law
plays in stimulating self-regulation of pharmaceutical manufacturers.
The defendant pharmaceutical company argued that the plaintiff’s
state tort law claims for failure-to-warn were preempted by
impossibility; specifically the defendant manufacturer claimed that
189
federal regulation prevented it from unilaterally changing its label.
The Court vehemently rejected this argument in a six-to-three
190
majority opinion authored by Justice Stevens.
In Wyeth v. Levine, the trial record revealed an example of
correspondence concerning the warning section of a label between
the FDA and the brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer over a
191
period of seventeen years.
The communication concerned the very
risk that led to amputation of the plaintiff’s arm, an injury that had
been reported to the manufacturer over twenty times prior to the
192
plaintiff’s fate.
This serves as an illustration of an overtaxed
regulatory agency overlooking crucial data, which had been directly
193
reported to it, with catastrophic results.
approval process to ensure accurate and up-to-date drug labels [were erroneous].”).
185
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
186
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
187
Id. at 559.
188
Id. at 561–62.
189
Id. at 562–63.
190
Id. at 558.
191
Id. at 561–62.
192
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563.
193
This case is illustrative of the inevitable oversights resulting from an
overburdened FDA: Phenergan, the drug which caused Levine’s injury, obtained
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The Wyeth Court went on to discuss the “two cornerstones of our
194
pre-emption jurisprudence.” To first determine Congress’s intent,
the Court discussed the history of the relevant federal regulation:
As it enlarged the FDA’s powers to protect the public health
and assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs,
Congress took care to preserve state law. The 1962
amendments added a saving clause, indicating that a
provision of state law would only be invalidated upon a
direct and positive conflict with the FDCA. Consistent with
that provision, state common-law suits continued unabated
despite FDA regulation. . . . And when Congress enacted an
express pre-emption provision for medical devices in 1976,
it declined to enact such a provision for prescription
195
drugs.
The Court rejected the pharmaceutical company’s argument that
unilaterally altering its warning would have put it in violation of
federal laws, “the very idea that the FDA would bring an enforcement
action against a manufacturer for strengthening a warning pursuant
196
to the CBE regulation is difficult to accept.” Wyeth’s argument that
the FDA was both the sole authority governing safety labeling, and
shouldered complete responsibility for it, was unreliable:
It has remained a central premise of federal drug
regulation that the manufacturer bears responsibility for
the content of its label at all times. It is charged both with
crafting an adequate label and with ensuring that its
warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on the
market. Indeed, prior to 2007, the FDA lacked the

FDA approval in 1955. In 1973 and 1976, label changes were made by Wyeth, the
manufacturer of Phenergan, through supplements to their NDA. In 1981, Wyeth
submitted a third supplement; discussions ensued intermittently over a span of
seventeen years. In 1988, Wyeth submitted revised labeling regarding the risks
accompanying a certain method of delivery; unfortunately, this was the same method
of delivery that led to the amputation of Levine’s arm and the injury of many other
patients over several years. The FDA failed to respond to Wyeth’s submission,
instead instructing them to “retain verbiage in current label.” Id. at 562 (citation
omitted). In 1998, seventeen years after Wyeth’s proposed label change, the FDA
did respond to the supplement but still failed to address the offending method of
delivery. Levine’s injury was incurred in 2000, approximately two decades after the
potential issue was brought to the attention of, and went unaddressed by, the FDA.
This calls into question the FDA’s ability to be the sole responsible entity for the
safety of a market of over 11,000 generic drugs. Id. at 561–62.
194
Id. at 565.
195
Id. at 567 (internal quotations and editing omitted).
196
Id. at 570.

STEELE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

476

1/9/2013 4:04 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:441
197

authority to order manufacturers to revise their labels.
Restricting safety oversight to the FDA alone would eviscerate the
complementary nature of state tort liability for the manufacturers of
198
pharmaceutical products.
“Second, ‘in all pre-emption cases, and particularly in . . . a field
which the States have traditionally occupied, we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
199
manifest purpose of Congress.’” The Court responded adversely to
Wyeth’s argument that the legislative intent was to create a floor and
a ceiling for liability within the FDA regulations. The Court
considered the absence of available remedies to patients within the
FDA’s regulatory framework indicative of congressional intent:
Congress did not provide a federal remedy for consumers
harmed by unsafe or ineffective drugs in the 1938 statute or
in any subsequent amendment. Evidently, it determined
that widely available state rights of action provided
appropriate relief for injured consumers. It may also have
recognized that state-law remedies further consumer
protection by motivating manufacturers to produce safe
200
and effective drugs and to give adequate warnings.
The Court posited that if state tort liability had been considered an
“obstacle to [Congress’s] objectives, it surely would have enacted an
express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCA’s 70201
As discussed supra, agency regulation should avoid
year history.”
preempting state law to the greatest extent possible, and where
197

Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 570–71.
The Wyeth Court emphasized the imperative role of state tort law in a rational
manner:
The FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the
market, and manufacturers have superior access to information about
their drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks emerge.
State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide
incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly.
They also serve a distinct compensatory function that may
motivate injured persons to come forward with information. Failure-towarn actions, in particular, lend force to the FDCA’s premise that
manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary responsibility for their drug
labeling at all times. Thus, the FDA long maintained that state law
offers an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that
complements FDA regulation.
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 579.
199
Id. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
200
Id. at 574 (internal citation omitted).
201
Id.
198
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unavoidable, should make preemption a clear intention. To the
contrary, “despite its 1976 enactment of an express pre-emption
provision for medical devices . . . (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)),
202
Congress has not enacted such a provision for prescription drugs.”
The Court construed Congress’s “silence on the issue, coupled with
its certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation, . . . [as]
powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be
203
the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.” The
justification for preemption is subject to exceptionally heightened
skepticism where Congress indicates its awareness of state regulation
in a field of federal interest, but declines to explicitly deny their
204
coexistence.
The final contention considered by the Court concerned the
FDA’s preamble to a 2006 publication. The FDA’s statement
expressed that “failure-to-warn claims ‘threaten FDA’s statutorily
prescribed role as the expert Federal agency responsible for
202

Id. President Barack Obama delivered a memorandum clearly stating his
policy on federal preemption of state law:
An understanding of the important role of State governments in our
Federal system is reflected in longstanding practices by executive
departments and agencies, which have shown respect for the
traditional prerogatives of the States. . . . To ensure that executive
departments and agencies include statements of preemption in
regulations only when such statements have a sufficient legal basis:
1. Heads of departments and agencies should not include in regulatory
preambles statements that the department or agency intends to
preempt State law through the regulation except where preemption
provisions are also included in the codified regulation.
2. Heads of departments and agencies should not include preemption
provisions in codified regulations except where such provisions would
be justified under legal principles governing preemption, including the
principles [of federalism].
3. Heads of departments and agencies should review regulations issued
within the past 10 years that contain statements . . . intended by the
department or agency to preempt State law. . . . Where the head of a
department or agency determines that [preemption is un]justified, the
head of that department or agency should initiate appropriate action,
which may include amendment of the relevant regulation.
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Preemption (May 20,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential
-memorandum-regarding-preemption.
203
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575.
204
Id. (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
166–67 (1989)).
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205

evaluating and regulating drugs.’”
The Court made clear that it
found this assertion particularly unpersuasive: “The weight we accord
the agency’s explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme
206
depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.”
The preamble statement was particularly inconsistent with the FDA’s
announcement that preceded the 2006 rule. “[I]n December 2000, it
explained that the rule would ‘not contain policies that have
207
federalism implications or that preempt State law.’”
Further, the preamble is at odds with what evidence we have
of Congress’ [sic] purposes, and it reverses the FDA’s own
longstanding position without providing a reasoned
explanation, including any discussion of how state law has
interfered with the FDA’s regulation of drug labeling
during decades of coexistence. . . . For instance, in 1998,
the FDA stated that it did “not believe that the evolution of
state tort law [would] cause the development of standards
that would be at odds with the agency’s regulations.” It
further noted that, in establishing “minimal standards” for
drug labels, it did not intend “to preclude the states from
208
imposing additional labeling requirements.”
The Court’s reasoning reflects a policy of setting reasonable
expectations through consistency.
V. PREEMPTION OF STATE FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIMS AGAINST GENERIC
MANUFACTURERS
In the years following Wyeth, district courts consistently found
that FDA regulations did not preempt the state tort law applicable to
the adequacy of brand-name pharmaceutical drug label warnings.
However, district courts clearly struggled with the application of the
holding in Wyeth to generic drug manufacturers whose labels were
governed by a framework materially different from that of brand209
name manufacturers.
The Supreme Court’s answer to that
210
question in Mensing came as a shock not only to the courts in the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits, but also to four of the Justices on the
bench. In a five-to-four decision, the divide between the justices was
palpable.
205
206
207
208
209
210

Id. (quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (2006)).
Id. at 1201.
Id. (quoting 65 Fed. Reg. 81103 (2000)).
Id. (quoting 63 Fed. Reg. 66378, 66384 (1998)).
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
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As introduced above, the cases of Mensing and Demahy
(“Plaintiffs”), consolidated for purposes of certiorari, sought to
answer the question “whether, and to what extent, generic
211
manufacturers may change their labels after initial FDA approval.”
The drug at issue was metoclopramide, the generic equivalent of the
brand-name drug Reglan.
Due to Plaintiffs’ respective state
substitution laws, in spite of the fact that their physicians had
prescribed the brand-name drug, both received the generic
212
alternative. The FDA approved Reglan in 1980 to be marketed for
the purpose of increasing the speed of food through the digestive
213
tract; generic manufacturers entered the market five years later. In
1985, the Reglan and metoclopramide labels were “modified to warn
that ‘tardive dyskinesia . . . may develop in patients treated with
metoclopramide,’ . . . and ‘therapy longer than 12 weeks has not
214
been evaluated and cannot be recommended.’”
In 2004, Reglan
requested that the label be strengthened to state that “therapy should
215
not exceed 12 weeks in duration.”
Plaintiffs were prescribed the
drug prior to that year. Not until 2009 did the FDA issue a black-box
warning for the drug’s association with tardive dyskinesia when used
216
longer than twelve weeks.
The timeline of this series of events
spanned nearly a quarter of a century, yet the first reports of a nexus
217
between the side effect and the drug were reported as early as 1978.
Plaintiffs asserted that the manufacturers of metoclopramide
had caused each of their injuries in violation of tort laws in their
218
respective states.
“They claimed that ‘despite mounting evidence
211

Id. at 2574.
EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at app. A (Minnesota and
Louisiana, the Plaintiffs’ states, are not amongst the states with the most aggressive
substitution laws.).
213
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 2573.
217
Report of Expert Steven H. Lamm, M.D. D.T.P.H., Burnett et al, v. Wyeth
Pharm. Inc., No. 3:08CV00575, 2008 WL 5653557 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2008).
218
The decision, however, does not turn on interpretation of the state laws. See
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573 (quoting Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d
782, 788 (Minn. 1977)); Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 269–70 (5th
Cir. 2002)). Under Minnesota law, which applies to Mensing’s lawsuit, “where the
manufacturer . . . of a product has actual or constructive knowledge of danger to
users, the . . . manufacturer has a duty to give warning of such dangers.” Mensing,
131 S. Ct. at 2573. Similarly, under Louisiana law applicable to Demahy’s lawsuit, “a
manufacturer’s duty to warn includes a duty to provide adequate instructions for safe
use of a product.” Id.
212
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that long term metoclopramide use carries a risk of tardive dyskinesia
far greater than that indicated on the label,’ none of the
Manufacturers had changed their labels to adequately warn of that
219
danger.” The manufacturers in both cases
urged that federal law pre-empted the state tort claims.
According to the Manufacturers, federal statutes and FDA
regulations required them to use the same safety and
efficacy labeling as their brand-name counterparts. This
means, they argued, that it was impossible to simultaneously
comply with both federal law and any state tort-law duty that
required them to use a different label. The Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits rejected the
Manufacturers’ arguments and held that Mensing and
220
Demahy’s claims were not pre-empted.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the issue turned on “whether,
and to what extent, generic manufacturers may change their labels
221
after initial FDA approval.” Written by Justice Thomas, the majority
proceeded to take the complete opposite stance to the Court’s
opinion in Wyeth, in which it found the FDA’s preference to have
222
complete dominion.
Curiously, this is in spite of the FDA’s submission of two separate
briefs in support of respondents. The FDA’s initial brief filed on
November 2, 2010, recommended dismissal of certiorari. The initial
discussion of congressional intent emphasized the lack of boundaries
that would ensue if the Court were to find preemption:
219

Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573 (quoting Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605
(8th Cir. 2009)); see also Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2010).
220
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573.
221
Id. at 2574. On petition for rehearing, however, the respondents attempted to
challenge this holding by logic established in Wyeth. According to their argument, at
no point are drug manufacturers required to market a product they know is unsafe by
state tort standards, thus giving generic manufacturers the ability to temporarily
withdraw their product from the market until its label can be made sufficient; as
such, the state and federal laws could have been simultaneously adhered to.
Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing at 3, Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09993, 09-1039, 09-1501) (citing Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 591 (2009)).
222
Justice Thomas in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009), authored a
separate concurrence that strongly emphasized his concern about the over-extension
of the preemption doctrine. Justice Thomas iterated that the separation of powers
made it crucial that Congress’s preemptive purpose be explicit in the language of the
relevant statute in order for a court to find that state laws were preempted by federal
regulations. “Pre-emption must turn on whether state law conflicts with the text of
the relevant federal statute or with the federal regulations authorized by that text.”
Id. at 588.
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Certainly, those Amendments were intended in part to
accelerate the availability of low-cost generic drugs. “But no
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.” That principle
is particularly apt here because the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments amend, and thus must be read in tandem with,
the rest of the FDCA. As Wyeth explains, the FDCA’s
purpose is to “bolster consumer protection against harmful
products,” and it reflects Congress’s determination that
widely available state rights of action provide appropriate
compensatory relief for injured consumers. Nothing in the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments suggests that Congress
intended to abandon those principles in the case of generic
223
drugs.
The brief went on to emphasize the Supreme Court’s emphasis
on certain inaction by Congress in Wyeth:
Moreover, this Court reasoned in Wyeth that, given
Congress’s 1976 enactment of an express preemption
provision for medical devices and its “certain awareness of
the prevalence of state tort litigation,” Congress “surely
would have enacted an express preemption provision” if it
believed that all “state-law suits posed an obstacle to its
objectives.” That reasoning applies here as well. Indeed, if
it did not, individuals harmed by inadequately labeled
generic drugs would (on petitioners’ view) have no remedy,
while individuals who took the same drug with the same
labeling in its brand-name form would (by virtue of Wyeth)
have a state tort remedy. “If Congress had intended to
deprive injured parties of a long available form of
compensation”—and to do so in such an inconsistent
manner—”it surely would have expressed that intent more
224
clearly.”
In spite of the deference afforded to an agency’s interpretation of its
regulations, the Court declined to adhere to the FDA’s position.
Following grant of certiorari, the FDA filed a second brief in
225
favor of Plaintiffs on March 2, 2011.
The FDA argued that the
method by which the drug had gained approval was not controlling
223

Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039), 2010 WL 4339894, at
*20-21 [hereinafter First Brief for the United States] (citing Dolan v. U.S., 130 S. Ct.
2533, 2547 (2010)).
224
Id. at *21 (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575).
225
Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-0993, 09-1039, 09-1501), 2011 WL
741927 [hereinafter Second Brief for the United States].
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in terms of the manufacturers’ responsibility for updating their labels
226
to conform to safety requirements. The FDA further asserted that
finding preemption would capriciously allow manufacturers to avoid
227
such responsibilities and arbitrarily deny relief to injured patients.
Although there is substantial deference given to the FDA’s
interpretation of its regulations, the Court clarified here that courts
“do not defer to an agency’s ultimate conclusion about whether state
228
law should be pre-empted.”
In spite of the FDA’s arguments, the Court found that the FDA
regulations required the drug manufacturer of an ANDA-approved
product to maintain an identical label to the reference-listed drug for
229
which it was approved as a generic equivalent. In assessing the CBE
method available to drug manufacturers to unilaterally alter labels for
the purpose of increasing drug warnings, the majority found that the
generic manufacturers’ necessary uniformity with the list drug
foreclosed their ability to unilaterally do so, even if it was necessary.
The majority made a similar finding in reference to other tools, such
as the DHCP letter, available to brand-name drug manufacturers
where urgency necessitates a label change in the absence of FDA
230
approval beforehand. If the generic drug changed its warning label
226
227

Id. at *24.
Id. at *26.
When, as here, federal law requires a manufacturer to act to update its
labeling, a State may impose a similar duty and consequent damages
liability for failing to meet that duty. . . . That framework for generic
drugs is in harmony with Wyeth’s rule for brand-name drugs:
Irrespective of whether a drug is approved under an NDA or an ANDA,
if the drug was misbranded due to new safety information not reflected
in its labeling, then the plaintiff’s claims are not preempted. The
manufacturer was under a federal duty to revise its federally approved
labeling and FDA gave it the ability to seek such changes. Petitioners,
by contrast, argue that they enjoy a free pass accorded to virtually no
other manufacturer regarding product labeling - in the field of drugs
or otherwise. Individuals harmed by inadequately labeled generic
drugs would (on petitioners’ view) have no remedy against the
manufacturer, while individuals who took the same drug with the same
labeling in its brand-name form would (by virtue of Wyeth) have such a
remedy.

Id.
228

Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575 n.3.
The federal preemption doctrines discussed supra required an explicit
foreclosure by the actual words of the regulations in order to find preemption; it is
difficult to understand the majority’s strained interpretation of the statute to find
conflict preemption given the lack of explicit preemption.
230
The Court cited to the FDA’s concern that “if generic drug manufacturers, but
not the brand-name manufacturer, sent such letters, that would inaccurately imply a
229
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on its own it would, per se, be in violation of FDA regulations and
lose its status of approval for marketing. The Court’s articulation of
the enquiry for impossibility preemption turned on “whether the
private party could independently do under federal law what state law
231
requires of it.”
Because the state tort laws required the
manufacturers to change their label in spite of this, the Court found
that they were federally preempted by the manufacturers’ resultant
impossibility to comport with both laws. In sum, FDA regulations
require “that the warning labels of a brand-name drug and its generic
copy must always be the same—thus, generic drug manufacturers
232
have an ongoing federal duty of ‘sameness.’”
In closing, Justice
Thomas “acknowledge[d] the unfortunate hand that federal drug
233
regulation . . . dealt [the patients] and others similarly situated.”
The majority further clarified that it did not necessarily consider the
holding reasonable; “it is not th[e] Court’s task to decide whether the
statutory scheme established by Congress is unusual or even
234
bizarre.”
The dissent, authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, persuasively disagreed with the
235
state of the law as the majority read it.
In disagreeing with the
therapeutic difference between the brand and generic drugs and thus could be
impermissibly ‘misleading.’” Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576 (quoting Second Brief for the
United States, at *19).
231
Id. at 2571.
232
Id. at 2574–75 (quoting Second Brief for the United States, at *16).
233
Id. at 2582.
234
Id. at 2582 (quoting Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2710
(2009)).
235
See id. at 2582–83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing the majority opinion at
2581).
The Court today invokes the doctrine of impossibility pre-emption to
hold that federal law immunizes generic-drug manufacturers from all
state-law failure-to-warn claims because they cannot unilaterally change
their labels. I cannot agree. We have traditionally held defendants
claiming impossibility to a demanding standard: Until today, the mere
possibility of impossibility had not been enough to establish preemption. . . . The Court strains to reach the opposite conclusion. It
invents new principles of pre-emption law out of thin air to justify its
dilution of the impossibility standard. It effectively rewrites our
decision in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), which holds that
federal law does not pre-empt failure-to-warn claims against brandname drug manufacturers. And a plurality of the Court tosses aside
our repeated admonition that courts should hesitate to conclude that
Congress intended to pre-empt state laws governing health and safety.
As a result of today’s decision, whether a consumer harmed by
inadequate warnings can obtain relief turns solely on the happenstance
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holding, the Justices asserted a more outcome-based interpretation of
preemption—advancing that Congress could never have intended
236
the results likely to come about through the majority’s holding.
The most offensive aspect of the majority holding was its antithetical
impact on “the core principle of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
that generic and brand-name drugs are the ‘same’ in nearly all
237
respects.”
There are an abundance of potential criticisms pertinent to the
application of preemption in Mensing. It is not challenging for even
passive observers to predict that the outcome will fail to adequately
and equally protect injured patients, will partially subvert the
Congressional intent of FDA regulations, will impermissibly relax the
safety standards of manufacturers of inherently dangerous products,
and will exponentially increase the responsibilities of an
overburdened federal agency. Extensive analysis of the Court’s
missteps is rendered futile in light of the denial of a rehearing; the
238
legislature must intervene to avert imminent inequitable results.
of whether her pharmacist filled her prescription with a brand-name or
generic drug. The Court gets one thing right: This outcome “makes
little sense.”
Id.
236

Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2591.
Id. at 2593. The Justices perceived that obliterating the perception of
sameness through dissimilar
liability rules threaten[s] to reduce consumer demand for generics, at
least among consumers who can afford brand-name drugs. They may
pose “an ethical dilemma” for prescribing physicians. . . . And they
may well cause the States to rethink their longstanding efforts to
promote generic use through generic substitution laws. . . . These
consequences are directly at odds with the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments’ goal of increasing consumption of generic drugs.
Id. (citations omitted).
238
Cases in the wake of Mensing have involved legally creative approaches to
obtain patient relief, but success in such approaches is elusive. See, e.g., In re
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 08–008, 2011 WL
5903623, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011) (In a multidistrict litigation proceeding, the
appointed court found preemption-by-impossibility for generic manufacturers in
claims including breach of express warranty, fraud, misrepresentation, failure to
conform to representation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of consumer
protection statutes. Rather than discussing each element, the judge referred to the
nature of each claim and held that they were functionally preempted for the same
reason as a failure-to-warn claim would be. The court further held that a claim for
breach of implied warranty was preempted because “duty of sameness” between
brand name and generic manufacturers transfers to design by way of the ANDA
bioequivalence requirement.); Metz v. Wyeth LLC, 830 F.Supp.2d 1291 (M.D. Fla.
2011) (declining to reconsider the state’s refusal to find liability for brand-name
manufacturers where a patient was injured by the generic on the theory that the
237
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VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The costs of healthcare are troubling for the nation as a whole
and for individual patients, yet, the pursuit of cost-savings must
achieve a balance with the protection of public health. Policies
aimed at decreasing expenses that pertain to prescription drug use by
expanding generic drug utilization have been vastly successful in that
sector—continuing to suppress expenditures is critical to fiscal
sustainability. Although elimination of tort liability would directly
reduce the operating costs of generic drug manufacturers, the
temptation must come second to the FDA’s central mission of
protecting the public health and responsibly fostering innovation.
Offices within the FDA itself have admitted that they continuously fall
short with respect to independent monitoring and regulation of the
239
prescription drug market, —as the sole overseer of ANDA-approved
drug labels, the FDA’s overwhelmed state is only likely to continue
based on the growth-oriented forecasts of generic drug use and
approval. Investigations spanning decades reveal egregious failures
that unquestionably overlooked direct harm to patients. Ominously,
these failures took place in a time when generic manufacturers were
still motivated to some extent by the potential costs of state tort
claims, given the explicit preemption of that liability the FDA’s
competency in oversight is of the utmost importance.
Since the genesis of legal liability in healthcare, tort law has
played a crucial role in maintaining safe practices amongst
participants in the market. Despite the vast expansion of federal
regulation, tort law continues to be recognized as protecting the
health and welfare of patients. As recently as 2009, the U.S. Supreme
Court has articulated the distinctive benefits of product liability laws
in exposing unknown drug hazards, inducing prompt and thorough
information-sharing by manufacturers, and compensating victims for
240
their injuries.
Given the interdependent nature of federal and state liability
laws in the context of healthcare, federal preemption of tort law has
extensive potential to impact injured persons because the FDA does
not provide remedy for private injuries. Ultimately, the Court’s
unambiguous interpretation of the federal regulations in Mensing
finding preemption for generic manufacturers cannot be overcome
brand-name owed a duty to the patient to update its own label so that the generic
manufacturer could do the same).
239
See supra Part IV.A.
240
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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by subsequent interpretations, no matter how reasonable the
argument. Instead, the extensive array of factors that the dissenting
justices and the various amicus curiae asserted against finding
preemption must now be used to support adaptation of federal
regulation in a way that will render preemption of state tort liability
for generic drug manufacturers a nullity.
To achieve the dual objectives of affordability and availability of
generics on one hand, and their safety on the other, the FDA must
find an acceptable middle ground. An example of such compromise
by the FDA between the competing priorities of generic drug policies
is evident in the expansion of charging user fees to generic
manufacturers to help fund FDA oversight. The increased cost to
generic manufacturers will be passed on to the consumer, but the
increased funding will aid the FDA in oversight of safety; a similar
compromise would serve the FDA well with respect to safety and cost
and label liability.
This Comment recommends adaptation of the federal
regulations pertaining to supplementation of approved drugs in a
manner mirroring the post-approval reporting requirements for
ANDA-approved drugs. The extensive mandates of 21 C.F.R. § 314.80
lay out the recording and reporting burdens of NDA holders with
respect to post-approval adverse events. The equivalent regulation
for ANDA holders is 21 C.F.R. § 314.98. Rather than laying out
independent requirements, this regulation indiscriminately adopts
the directives of § 314.80, requiring the same adverse event recordkeeping and reporting as that of brand-name drug manufacturers.
This approach is evidence of recognition that manufacturers of
generic drugs are in at least an equivalent position to that of brandname drug manufacturers to collect post-market safety information
and report it. Given generics’ dominant share of a market following
entry, it is more likely that they are in a superior position to collect
and report date than their brand-name competitor. Generics
account for the vast majority of prescription drug consumption and
approximately a third of marketed generics have no brand-name
241
counterpart on the market at all; naturally, absence of public usage
eliminates reporting requirements entirely, leaving all data collection
to the generic manufacturer.
The CBE method embodied in 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) is
derivative of the FDA’s prioritization of public safety. Endowing
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independent power to brand-name drug manufacturers to modify
their labels in a manner that will sufficiently notify consumers of
moderate changes to label warnings is a vehicle of efficiency that errs
on the side of disclosure and relinquishes agency control. The
language used throughout the regulation to describe warnings that
should be updated is rather similar to standards promulgated by most
state tort failure-to-warn statutes; both contemplate adequate and fair
notice to consumers of safe use and the risks they run in utilizing the
enclosed product. In 21 C.F.R. § 314.97, the language directs ANDA
holders to § 314.70 for matters necessitating post-market label
supplementation. The operation of § 314.97 for generic label
changes is, at first glance, equivalent to the adoption of brand-name
standards in adverse event reporting for generic drugs. The effects
are not interpreted the same though; 21 C.F.R. §314.150 creates a
duty of “sameness” with regard to the label of a generic drug and the
reference listed drug—this duty trumps the generic manufacturer’s
242
ability to make unilateral label changes under § 314.70(c)(6)(iii).
In order to influence § 314.97 in a manner that will allow a drug
approved pursuant to an ANDA, § 314.150 should be reformed.
Rather than a per se rule that a generic drug must perpetually
duplicate the reference listed drug upon which it initially relied for
approval, a rule more mutually applicable should be promulgated.
Following a pre-determined period, both drugs should be obligated
to mimic the label of the other so long as divergent changes do not
come to light. The trigger for generic manufacturer independence
should be the greater of either a specific lapse of time or a quantified
level of market share following its launch. These measures should
determine the position a generic manufacturer would need to reach
to be capable of collecting sufficient event reports. If the generic
manufacturer never reaches the trigger point that has been
established, it should continue to be guided by § 314.150. While the
concern has been raised that varying labels will decrease the
perception of “sameness,” this issue is not implicated by the proposed
solution. The current regulation allows for a time gap between a
243
brand-name manufacturer’s label change and a generic’s —allowing
a reversal in this order would have no functional impact on consumer
perception or use.
The fundamental underlying rationale for the labeling
requirement of § 314.150 in its current form is the approval process
242
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of generic drugs, not the subsequent market use of those drugs.
Eventually the generic drug’s initial reliance on the reference list
drug’s safety and efficacy is devoid of utility beyond the cost savings it
provided for approval by eradicating the need for clinical trials.
Although extensive, costly, and time-consuming, clinical trials
conducted for the purposes of a NDA have limited value in terms of
long-term safety and realistic patient populations. A novel drug, by
definition, is new to the market, thus long-term studies do not exist in
the absence of long-term use. Patient populations in new drug
studies are limited by strict study parameters, therefore patient-types
that will be treated in the real world may not have been significantly
represented in the trials, furthermore serious but rarer adverse events
often go undiscovered initially. Based upon these weaknesses and the
costs of extending or initiating formal studies beyond what is
required for approval, long-term safety data is determined extensively
through tracking and analysis of the post-market reports compiled by
brand and generic manufacturers alike. Upon potential discovery of
a previously unknown adverse drug effect, statistical analysis or
245
studies may be required to discern causation.
As a tenet of the
compromise suggested between maintaining safety and reducing
costs, it may be reasonable to require that these studies be conducted
by the generic company if they are a market leader, this can be a
determination made by the FDA on a case-by-case basis founded on
predetermined factors such as market share and so on.
In the absence of reforming FDA regulation of generic drug
label practices, the goals of Congress are at risk of subversion. One of
the FDA’s central purposes is to ensure safety of the drugs it oversees;
because Congress created the FDA, this should be considered an aim
of Congress as well. Consequently, the focus on safety must coexist
with the aim of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments toward driving
down the costs of prescription drugs and current legislative emphasis
on driving down the cost of healthcare in general. When measuring
healthcare costs in a universal sense, it is impossible to ignore the
implications of consequences visited upon patients where drug labels
fail to adequately warn of certain risks. The cost to patients such as
Mensing and Demahy are life-long and will be borne by the public
244
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sector through programs such as disability or Medicare.
Safe use of medicine and cost-effective healthcare go hand-inhand; Mensing fails to strike an adequate balance between cost-savings
and safety. Tort liability will undoubtedly drive up the cost of doing
business for generic companies, and they are likely to pass that cost
along to consumers; however, product liability only requires that
warnings be reasonable. It is hard to imagine that patients would
benefit if generic drug manufacturers were not held to a standard of
reasonableness.
Generic drugs can decrease costs for patients only if patients are
willing to take them. The present lack of tort liability is likely to
create a perception in the collective mind of the consuming public
that generic manufacturers do not have the same emphasis on safety
that their brand counterparts do. Even in the absence of this
concern, consumers may find reason for anxiety in the generic
manufacturer’s inability to update a label’s warning independently
where they are compelled to do so. Additionally, if savvy patients lack
confidence that they will have avenues for relief when injured by a
drug, they are far more likely to demand the costlier brand-name
246
version of that prescription.
Alternatively, where patients’
prescriptions are substituted at the pharmacy, many are unlikely to be
aware of the risks they are taking until they find themselves without
remedy in a court of law.
The market of authorized generics further erodes the logic of
the comprehensive federal regulation of drug safety; to allow
preemption of state tort liability for a brand manufacturer based on
packaging would certainly distort congressional intent. Perhaps the
single most significant consideration in generic drug cost concerns
will be exacerbated by not negating Mensing. The very states that have
been disgorged of private actions for their citizens’ tort claims also
247
act as the greatest source of generic prescriptions. The substitution
laws of each state are likely to be approached more critically if the
states come to consider the dangers of generic consumption as
outweighing its benefits. The duty of “sameness” should be limited
wherever it is promulgated in the regulations applicable to all postmarket activities.
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VII. CONCLUSION
While cost savings and reducing barriers in equal access to care
are lofty healthcare goals, they should not eviscerate the standard of
safety incumbent upon manufacturers of products that are dangerous
by their very nature. If a generic drug label does harm by failing to
adequately warn physicians or patients about the risks they are taking,
it does not atone for this by merely being affordable. There is a level
of trust given to the medical community that must be protected in
order to forward the goals of healthcare; this trust cannot be
maintained if the legislature prevents states from holding producers
of medicine accountable for their failures.
In the frenetic and divided political environment of healthcare
and the role of government within it, there is major reform
underway.
The reform maintains and expands long-term
appreciation for the merits of generic drug utilization. Cost savings
and equality in delivery are especially emphasized goals in the
transformation of healthcare, and generics have consistently proven
that they deliver in these areas. This Comment does not propose that
the ANDA process be disproportionately limited, or that generics
should do independent safety or efficacy studies in coming to market.
Increasing the cost of bringing a generic drug to market can and
should be avoided in addressing the risks created by the holding in
Mensing; however, the law should not go so far as to inhibit consumer
safety. Present legislation should be reformed to allow generic
manufacturers to alter their warnings post-approval through the same
methods currently available to brand manufacturers. This simple
reform would in turn negate the preemption-by-impossibility found
in Mensing and maintain a critical balance between controlling
healthcare costs and preserving safety. Cost savings in the market will
not be achieved by incentivizing patients to demand more expensive
products, or by reducing the motivation in the market for drug
manufacturers to produce and maintain effective warning labels.
Generic drugs account for the vast majority of prescriptions
consumed. If they lead to greater harm than a brand-manufacturer’s
product does, it is very likely to drive up the cost of care in this
country, and this result is the exact opposite of the Congressional
goals behind the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. By affording generic
drug manufacturers the ability to increase safety warnings through
the same mechanisms as their brand-name counterparts, the
legislature will prevent the harmful results that will inevitably follow
the holding in Mensing.

